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Online Fair Allocation in Autonomous Vehicle Sharing | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

Online Fair Allocation in Autonomous Vehicle Sharing


Abstract:

Autonomous vehicle industry is developing by leaps and bounds. We envisage a situation where autonomous vehicles act as taxis to transport clients. During the transportat...Show More

Abstract:

Autonomous vehicle industry is developing by leaps and bounds. We envisage a situation where autonomous vehicles act as taxis to transport clients. During the transportation, vehicle sharing is enabled and encouraged. We propose fair allocation in payment for passengers of a shared vehicle. The allocation is endowed with the characteristics of envy freeness and maximin utilities. Furthermore, we devise working mechanisms for autonomous vehicles, including (i) planning routes with minimum detour; (ii) choosing clients to recommend vehicle sharing; (iii) carrying passengers continuously. Our work may serve as a good preparation for the marketization of autonomous taxis.
Date of Conference: 04-08 December 2017
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 15 January 2018
ISBN Information:
Conference Location: Singapore
References is not available for this document.

I. Introduction

The transportation industry is about to undergo unprecedentedly dramatic changes due to the technology of autonomous vehicles or self-driving cars. Since The Google self-driving car project (Waymo) [1] was revealed in 2010, this technology has been given priority by some business magnates such as Daimler [2], Nissan [3], Baidu [4]. Startups like drive.ai [5] and Otto [6] have been bent on relevant research and development. Support from government has been extended and intensified.

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References

References is not available for this document.