Should Altruistic Deception of HAVs be Permitted? A Case Study of Unprotected Left Turns under EHMI Application*

Autonomous driving system is rapidly advancing, resulting in more Highly Automated Vehicles (HAVs) interacting with human-driven vehicles. In order to ensure safety during interaction, External Human-Machine Interface (EHMI) serves as a channel to display HAVs’ status and intentions. However, from the perspective of game theory, the selfish act of disclosing false information is detrimental to the advancement of HAV in most cases. It raises the question of whether certain acts of altruistic deception should be permitted if they can enhance the benefit for everyone in some certain cases. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate strategies for EHMI information disclosure. In this study, we establish a game-theoretic model of unprotected left-turn intersection scenarios. The impact of EHMI information disclosure is taken into consideration. The proposed model effectively achieves the simultaneous maximization of safety and efficiency during the human-machine interaction. In theory, altruistic deception may have benefits in certain scenarios, but from a practical standpoint, it is detrimental to the development of HAVs in the long run. Therefore, we recommend disclosing authentic information. By examining the benefits and potential drawbacks of altruistic deception, as well as considering the ethical considerations and legal implications, this study aims to contribute to the ongoing discourse on the ethical framework governing autonomous driving system.