I. Introduction
Public key encryption is based on computational security, which is the assumption that the encryption system is safe from the attacks of an eavesdropper with limited computing power. As quantum computing advances, it has become apparent that some schemes considered computationally secure may be vulnerable to quantum algorithm-supported attacks. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cipher or Diffie-Hellman key exchange are examples of cryptographic schemes that have been proven vulnerable to quantum attacks [1]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proposed as a complementary technology to traditional encryption schemes to improve the secrecy of the shared keys. The security of QKD schemes is based on the inherent randomness of quantum physical systems, and not on the computational complexity of solving a mathematical problem [2], [3], [4]. In QKD-secured communication, the source wants to establish a secure channel to communicate sensitive information to the receiver. To secure the contents of the message, an encryption scheme that uses the keys generated with QKD is used. The QKD protocol needs a quantum channel to propagate the states and an authenticated classical channel to exchange information about the measurements.