PQC Secure: Strategies for Defending Against Quantum Threats

As quantum computing emerges, the security domain is set to encounter unparalleled challenges, necessitating a pivotal shift to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) for safeguarding against quantum adversities. Current cryptographic mechanisms, especially RSA and ECC, are susceptible to quantum breaches due to their reliance on factorization and discrete logarithm problems. The emergence of quantum computers endangers traditional cryptographic infrastructures, exposing them to swift decryption by algorithms like Shor’s, $N=p \cdot q$, and Grover’s, $r \equiv a^{\frac{N}{2}} \bmod N$, where N is the product of two significant primes, p and q, and r denotes the remainder after applying Grover’s algorithm to a. Conventional cryptographic methods, which rest on problems solvable by quantum computers, emphasize the need to transition to PQC, substituting prevalent methods with quantum-resilient alternatives, represented by $E=m^{e} \bmod n$, where E is the encrypted message, m the plaintext, e the public key exponent, and n the product of two prime numbers. This research evaluates the efficacy of PQC approaches, encompassing lattice-based, code-based, and isogeny-based cryptography, with assessments based on metrics like encryption duration, $T_{e}=\frac{1}{f_{e}}$, and key length, $\log _{2}(N)$, where $T_{e}$ represents encryption time and $f_{e}$ the encryption speed. Employing standardized datasets, we examine encryption and decryption speeds, key sizes, and success metrics against NIST’s endorsed security standards. The findings underscore PQC’s potential in delivering robust security, albeit with variations in performance metrics, guiding secure communication choices. In summation, the study highlights the essential shift to PQC in addressing the vulnerabilities ushered in by quantum computing, presenting a spectrum of fortified strategies for the future of information security.