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Quantifying information leakage in a processor caused by the execution of instructions | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

Quantifying information leakage in a processor caused by the execution of instructions


Abstract:

Covert/side channel attacks based on electromagnetic (EM) emanations are difficult to detect because they are practiced wirelessly. Hence, quantifying information leakage...Show More

Abstract:

Covert/side channel attacks based on electromagnetic (EM) emanations are difficult to detect because they are practiced wirelessly. Hence, quantifying information leakage is crucial when designing secure hardware and software. To address this problem, this paper establishes a connection between the signal energy available to an attacker in electromagnetic side/covert channel and capacity of the covert/side channel. We first present a mathematical relationship between electromagnetic side-channel energy (ESE) of individual instructions and measured side-channel signal power, assuming that all instructions have equal execution time. Then, we use this measure to calculate the transition probabilities needed for estimating capacity. Furthermore, we consider each instruction as a codeword and relate our model to Shannon's capacity. Finally, we provide practical examples to demonstrate the severity of covert/side channel due to EM emanations.
Date of Conference: 23-25 October 2017
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 11 December 2017
ISBN Information:
Electronic ISSN: 2155-7586
Conference Location: Baltimore, MD, USA

References

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