Abstract:
Extensive integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) has introduced stability challenges to power grids due to their low-inertia nature and grid-following control con...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
Extensive integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) has introduced stability challenges to power grids due to their low-inertia nature and grid-following control configuration. To address these challenges, recent IEEE standards, e.g., IEEE 1547.1-2020, recommended grid-connected IBRs to provide grid-supporting functions, necessitating communication with utility control centers through various protocols. However, deployment of communication protocols exposes grid-connected IBRs to various threats originated from cyber-layer, endangering overall system stability. To make IBRs resilient to cyber-threats, knowledge about possible attacks and relevant consequences is required. On this basis, this paper emphasizes on vulnerability of grid-connected IBRs to a new family of resonance cyber-attacks. In this attack, the adversary induces harmonic instability by launching a resonance false data injection attack (FDIA) on the IBR's communication layer. To this aim, the attacker can take advantage of impedance-based models or frequency scanning approaches to determine the resonance frequency of the IBR with the grid. Through injecting sinusoidal noise within the resonance frequency range into the signals communicating between sensors or grid-supporting functions and IBRs, the adversary excites the resonance modes of the IBR with the grid, leading to instability of the inverter. The simulation results on a LCL-type grid-connected inverter demonstrated that this resonance FDIA can cause extensive current and voltage harmonic distortion at the inverter's point of common coupling (PCC), which can triggers protection devices and lead to inverter trip.
Date of Conference: 17-20 June 2024
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 20 November 2024
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