Abstract:
Recent website fingerprinting attacks have been shown to achieve very high performance against traffic through Tor. These attacks allow an adversary to deduce the website...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
Recent website fingerprinting attacks have been shown to achieve very high performance against traffic through Tor. These attacks allow an adversary to deduce the website a Tor user has visited by simply eavesdropping on the encrypted communication. This has consequently motivated the development of many defense strategies that obfuscate traffic through the addition of dummy packets and/or delays. The efficacy and practicality of many of these recent proposals have yet to be scrutinized in detail. In this study, we re-evaluate nine recent defense proposals that claim to provide adequate security with low-overheads using the latest Deep Learning-based attacks. Furthermore, we assess the feasibility of implementing these defenses within the current confines of Tor. To this end, we additionally provide the first on-network implementation of the DynaFlow defense to better assess its real-world utility.
Published in: 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Date of Conference: 21-25 May 2023
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 21 July 2023
ISBN Information: