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Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Issue 1 • Date January 2012

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Displaying Results 1 - 24 of 24
  • Table of contents

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): c1 - c4
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  • [Staff list]

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): c2
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  • Guest Editorial Game Theory in Wireless Communications

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 1 - 3
    Cited by:  Papers (1)
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  • Anti-Jamming Games in Multi-Channel Cognitive Radio Networks

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 4 - 15
    Cited by:  Papers (11)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (528 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Crucial to the successful deployment of cognitive radio networks, security issues have begun to receive research interests recently. In this paper, we focus on defending against the jamming attack, one of the major threats to cognitive radio networks. Secondary users can exploit the flexible access to multiple channels as the means of anti-jamming defense. We first investigate the situation where a secondary user can access only one channel at a time and hop among different channels, and model it as an anti-jamming game. Analyzing the interaction between the secondary user and attackers, we derive a channel hopping defense strategy using the Markov decision process approach with the assumption of perfect knowledge, and then propose two learning schemes for secondary users to gain knowledge of adversaries to handle cases without perfect knowledge. In addition, we extend to the scenario where secondary users can access all available channels simultaneously, and redefine the anti-jamming game with randomized power allocation as the defense strategy. We derive the Nash equilibrium for this Colonel Blotto game which minimizes the worst-case damage. Finally, simulation results are presented to verify the performance. View full abstract»

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  • Towards Optimal Adaptive UFH-Based Anti-Jamming Wireless Communication

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 16 - 30
    Cited by:  Papers (4)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (873 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Anti-jamming communication without pre-shared secrets has gained increasing research interest recently and is commonly tackled by utilizing the technique of uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH). Existing researches, however, are almost all based on ad hoc designs of frequency hopping strategies, mainly due to lack of theoretical foundations for scheme performance evaluation. To fill this gap, in this paper we introduce the online optimization theory into our solution and, for the first time, make the thorough quantitative performance characterization possible for UFH-based anti-jamming communications. Specifically, we formulate the UFH-based anti-jamming communication as a non-stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem and propose an online learning-based UFH algorithm achieving asymptotic optimum. To reduce the time and space complexity, we further develop an enhanced algorithm exploiting the internal structure of strategy selection process. We analytically prove the optimality of the proposed algorithms under various message coding scenarios. An extensive simulation study is conducted to validate our theoretical analysis and show that the learning-based UFH algorithms are resilient against both oblivious and adaptive jamming attacks. View full abstract»

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  • Saddle-Point Strategies in Malware Attack

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 31 - 43
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (599 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Given the flexibility that software-based operation provides, it is unreasonable to expect that new malware will demonstrate a fixed behavior over time. Instead, malware can dynamically change the parameters of their infective hosts in response to the dynamics of the network, in order to maximize their overall damage. However, in return, the network can also dynamically change its counter-measure parameters in order to attain a robust defense against the spread of malware while minimally affecting the normal performance of the network. The infinite dimension of freedom introduced by variation over time and antagonistic and strategic optimization of malware and network against each other demand new attempts for modeling and analysis. We develop a zero-sum dynamic game model and investigate the structural properties of the saddle-point strategies. We specifically show that saddle-point strategies are simple threshold-based policies and hence, a robust dynamic defense is practicable. View full abstract»

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  • Power Control Game in Multi-Terminal Covert Timing Channels

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 44 - 53
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (773 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We present a game theoretic power control of overlay/overt communications to maximize the goodput (effective throughput of error-free bits) of multi-terminal covert timing channels. Most approaches in the literature on covert timing channels discuss capacities of the timing channels but do not study how the overlay communication can be controlled to maximize the goodput of covert timing channels. We study the factors of the overlay communication that affect the goodput of each timing channel in a multi-terminal covert timing network. We show that the goodput of the covert timing channel can be enhanced by increasing the rate of overlay transmission and by game theoretic power control of overlay communication. We finally extend the game theoretic power control to maximize the goodput of each covert timing channel in a multi-terminal covert timing network by maximizing the asymptotic spectral efficiency of the overlay communication. View full abstract»

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  • Reinforcement Learning for Repeated Power Control Game in Cognitive Radio Networks

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 54 - 69
    Cited by:  Papers (6)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (862 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Cognitive radio (CR) users are expected to be uncoordinated users that opportunistically seek the spectrum resource from primary users (PUs) in a competitive way. In most existing works, however, CR users are required to share the interference channel information and power strategies to conduct the game with pricing mechanisms that incur the frequent exchange of information. The requirement of significant communication overheads among CR users impedes fully distributed solutions for the deployment of CR networks, which is a challenging problem in the research communities. In this paper, a robust distributed power control algorithm is designed with low implementation complexity for CR networks through reinforcement learning, which does not require the interference channel and power strategy information among CR users (and from CR users to PUs). To the best of our knowledge, this research provides the solution for the first time for the incomplete-information power control game in CR networks. During the repeated game, CR users can control their power strategies by observing the interference from the feedback signals of PUs and transmission rates obtained in the previous step. This procedure allows achieving high spectrum efficiency while conforming to the interference constraint of PUs. This constrained repeated stochastic game with learning automaton is proved to be asymptotically equivalence to the traditional game with complete information. The properties of existence, diagonal concavity and uniqueness for the game are studied. A Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning procedure is designed for the power control algorithm, and the properties of convergence and learning rate of the algorithm are analyzed. The performance of the learning-based power control algorithm is thoroughly investigated with simulation results, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in solving variety of practical CR network problems for real-world applications. View full abstract»

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  • Nash Bargaining Game Theoretic Scheduling for Joint Channel and Power Allocation in Cognitive Radio Systems

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 70 - 81
    Cited by:  Papers (14)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (2908 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper proposes a new Nash bargaining solution (NBS) based cooperative game-theoretic scheduling framework for joint channel and power allocation in orthogonal frequency division multiple access cognitive radio (CR) systems. Our objectives are to maximize the overall throughput of the CR system with the protection of primary users' transmission, while guaranteeing each CR user's minimum rate requirement and the proportional fairness and efficient power distribution among CR users. Using time-sharing variable transformation, we introduce a novel method that involves Lambert-W function properties and obtain closed-form analytical solutions. A low-complexity algorithm is also developed which does not require iterative processes as usual to search the optimal solution numerically. Simulation results demonstrate that our optimal policies outperform the existing maximal rate, fixed assignment and max-min fairness, while achieving the 99.985% in average of the optimal capacity. View full abstract»

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  • Multichannel Opportunistic Carrier Sensing for Stable Channel Access Control in Cognitive Radio Systems

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 82 - 95
    Cited by:  Papers (12)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (713 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper we propose to use the well known game theoretic Gale-Shapley stable marriage theorem from game theory as a basis for spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks. We analyze the performance of the proposed solution and provide tight lower and upper bounds on both the stable allocation and the optimal allocation performance. Then we present a novel opportunistic multichannel medium access control technique that achieves stable allocation within a single CSMA contention window. We discuss practical implementation issues and put forward two other varieties of the algorithm which have lower implementation complexity. Finally, we provide simulated examples. View full abstract»

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  • Distributed Learning Policies for Power Allocation in Multiple Access Channels

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 96 - 106
    Cited by:  Papers (10)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (809 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We analyze the power allocation problem for orthogonal multiple access channels by means of a non-cooperative potential game in which each user distributes his power over the channels available to him. When the channels are static, we show that this game possesses a unique equilibrium; moreover, if the network's users follow a distributed learning scheme based on the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, then they converge to equilibrium exponentially fast. On the other hand, if the channels fluctuate stochastically over time, the associated game still admits a unique equilibrium, but the learning process is not deterministic; just the same, by employing the theory of stochastic approximation, we find that users still converge to equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis hinges on a novel result which is of independent interest: in finite-player games which admit a (possibly nonlinear) convex potential, the replicator dynamics converge to an ε-neighborhood of an equilibrium in time O(log(1/ε)). View full abstract»

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  • A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Code Synchronization for CDMA Wireless Systems

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 107 - 118
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (2356 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper introduces a game-theoretic formulation for the problem of resource allocation in an infrastructure CDMA wireless communication network, focusing on the issue of initial code synchronization. To capture the tradeoff between obtaining good synchronization performance and saving as much energy as possible, we propose a noncooperative game in which each transmitter-receiver pair seeks to maximize the ratio of the probability of code alignment detection to the transmitted energy per acquisition, under a constraint on the maximum probability of spurious code locks - this is achieved by properly setting the receiver threshold and the transmit power. Our framework also considers the coexistence between different types of synchronizers and different QoS requirements. The generalized Nash solution of the game is investigated and closed-form expressions are derived and compared with simulation results for an iterative decentralized algorithm. View full abstract»

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  • On the Partially Overlapped Channel Assignment on Wireless Mesh Network Backbone: A Game Theoretic Approach

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 119 - 127
    Cited by:  Papers (11)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (642 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) has already been recognized as a promising broadband access network technology from both academic and commercial perspective. In order to improve the performance of WMNs, extensive research efforts have been dedicated towards finding means to increase the number of simultaneous transmissions in the network while avoiding signal interference among radios. In case of WMNs based on IEEE 802.11 b/g standards, most recent research works have relied upon the usage of orthogonal channels for solving the Channel Assignment (CA) problem. In this paper, we explore the possibility of exploiting Partially Overlapped Channels (POCs) by introducing a novel game theoretic distributed CA algorithm. Our proposed algorithm outperforms both the conventional orthogonal channel approach and the recent heuristic CA algorithms using POC. The proposed algorithm is shown to achieve near-optimal performance in the average case. In addition, the upper bound Price of Anarchy for Multi-Radio Multi-Channel (MRMC) networks is derived to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. View full abstract»

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  • A Channel Aware MAC Protocol in an ALOHA Network with Selfish Users

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 128 - 137
    Cited by:  Papers (3)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (1088 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider a game theoretic model incorporating channel state information into slotted ALOHA in a fading environment. Each user sets a threshold for her channel gain and sends a packet only when the channel gain is higher than the threshold at a given slot. This threshold is decided to maximize the net benefit of a user, utility minus power consumption. The asymptotic behaviors of the total throughput at a symmetric Nash equilibrium point are studied for fading and non-fading environments in a homogeneous system. It is shown that the total throughput in a fading environment increases as the number of users increases, while the total throughput in the simple classical slotted ALOHA decreases when users are sensitive enough to power consumption. Convergence to the symmetric Nash equilibrium is also studied. View full abstract»

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  • Selfish Random Access over Wireless Channels with Multipacket Reception

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 138 - 152
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (1529 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper analyzes layer 2 contention resolution strategies for wireless networks with multipacket reception by using noncooperative game theory. Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for a strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium. Applications of the derived equilibrium conditions to predict selfish behavior and the resulting equilibrium performance are illustrated in specific communication scenarios along with various design insights. The collective equilibrium behavior of wireless networks with large user populations is also studied, and a Poisson-Bernoulli type approximation is obtained for the total number of packet arrivals. Finally, random access control with imperfect information structure is considered, the form of equilibrium strategies as well as uniqueness and existence results for general wireless channel models are obtained, and the best-response learning dynamics achieving an equilibrium are illustrated in specific instances. View full abstract»

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  • Spectrum Pricing Games with Spatial Reuse in Cognitive Radio Networks

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 153 - 164
    Cited by:  Papers (14)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (657 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRN), there are multiple primary and secondary users in a region, and primaries can lease out their unused bandwidth to secondaries in exchange for a fee. This gives rise to price competition among the primaries, wherein each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for its bandwidth than the other primaries. Radio spectrum has the distinctive feature that transmissions at neighboring locations on the same channel interfere with each other, whereas the same channel can be used at far-off locations without mutual interference. So in the above price competition scenario in a CRN, each primary must jointly select a set of mutually non-interfering locations within the region (which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the region) at which to offer bandwidth and the price at each location. In this paper, we analyze this price competition scenario as a game and seek a Nash Equilibrium (NE). We identify a class of conflict graphs, which we refer to as mean valid graphs, such that the conflict graphs of a large number of topologies that commonly arise in practice are mean valid. We explicitly compute a symmetric NE in mean valid graphs and show that it is unique. View full abstract»

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  • The Theory of Intervention Games for Resource Sharing in Wireless Communications

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 165 - 175
    Cited by:  Papers (8)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (415 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis of a new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulate intervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, and prove its existence in a finite intervention game. We apply our framework to resource sharing scenarios in wireless communications, whose non-cooperative outcomes without intervention yield suboptimal performance. We derive analytical results and analyze illustrative examples in the cases of imperfect and perfect monitoring. In the case of imperfect monitoring, intervention schemes can improve the suboptimal performance of non-cooperative equilibrium when the intervention device has a sufficiently accurate monitoring technology, although it may not be possible to achieve the best feasible performance. In the case of perfect monitoring, the best feasible performance can be obtained with an intervention scheme when the intervention device has a sufficiently strong intervention capability. View full abstract»

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  • The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 176 - 187
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (460 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper considers the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node, one destination node, and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their own profit instead of the social welfare. The paper considers the practical situation where the channel state on any given relay path is not observable to the source or to the other relays. Different bargaining relationships between the source and the relays are considered, and a framework for studying the efficiency loss induced by incomplete information is proposed. The source of the efficiency loss is analyzed, and the amount of inefficiency which results is quantified. View full abstract»

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  • Non-Cooperative Feedback-Rate Control Game for Channel State Information in Wireless Networks

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 188 - 197
    Cited by:  Papers (13)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (1075 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    It has been well recognized that channel state information (CSI) feedback is of great importance for downlink transmissions of closed-loop wireless networks. However, the existing work typically researched the CSI feedback problem for each individual mobile station (MS), and thus, cannot efficiently model the interactions among self-interested mobile users in the network level. To this end, in this paper, we propose an alternative approach to investigate the CSI feedback-rate control problem in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework, in which a multiple-antenna base station (BS) communicates with a number of co-channel MSs through linear precoder. Specifically, we first present a non-cooperative feedback-rate control game (NFC), in which each MS selects the feedback-rate to maximize its performance in a distributed way. To improve efficiency from a social optimum point of view, we then introduce pricing, called the non-cooperative feedback-rate control game with price (NFCP). The game utility is defined as the performance gain by CSI feedback minus the price as a linear function of the CSI feedback-rate. The existence of the Nash equilibrium of such games is investigated, and two types of feedback protocols (FDMA and CSMA) are studied. Simulation results show that by adjusting the pricing factor, the distributed NFCP game results in close optimal performance compared with that of the centralized scheme. View full abstract»

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  • Game Dynamics and Cost of Learning in Heterogeneous 4G Networks

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 198 - 213
    Cited by:  Papers (12)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (1401 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, we study game dynamics and learning schemes for heterogeneous 4G networks. We introduce a novel learning scheme called cost-to-learn that incorporates the cost to switch, the switching delay, and the cost of changing to a new action and, captures the realistic behavior of the users that we have experimented on OPNET simulations. Considering a dynamic and uncertain environment where the users and operators have only a numerical value of their own payoffs as information, we construct various heterogeneous combined fully distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learning (CODIPAS-RL): the users try to learn their own optimal payoff and their optimal strategy simultaneously. We establish the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories as solution of differential equations. Using evolutionary game dynamics, we prove the convergence and stability properties in specific classes of dynamic robust games. We provide various numerical examples and OPNET simulations in the context network selection in wireless local area networks (WLAN) and Long Term Evolution (LTE). View full abstract»

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  • Authors Information

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 214
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  • 2011 Index

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 215
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  • Call for papers

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): 240
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  • Staff list

    Publication Year: 2012 , Page(s): c3
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Aims & Scope

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications focuses on all telecommunications, including telephone, telegraphy, facsimile, and point-to-point television, by electromagnetic propagation.

Full Aims & Scope

Meet Our Editors

Editor-in-Chief
Muriel Médard
MIT