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Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Issue 7 • Date September 2008

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Displaying Results 1 - 25 of 33
  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Table of contents

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): i
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  • IEEE Communications Society - Editorial Board

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): ii
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  • Game Theory Applied to Computer and Communication Systems [Foreword to the Special Issue]

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1041
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    This special issue of the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications presents a compilation of many recent applications of game theory to engineering. View full abstract»

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  • Game Theory in Communication Systems [Guest Editorial]

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1042 - 1046
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (219 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The 26 papers in this special issue focus on game theory in communication systems. The papers are grouped in four clusters according to their topics: (1) Physical layer models in wireless communications, (2) higher layer and cross-layer issues in wireless communications, (3) wire-line communication networks, and (4) specific topics including peer-to-peer networking, network coding, and network security. View full abstract»

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  • Non-Atomic Games for Multi-User Systems

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1047 - 1058
    Cited by:  Papers (9)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (517 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this contribution, the performance of a multiuser system is analyzed in the context of frequency selective fading channels. Using game theoretic tools, a useful framework is provided in order to determine the optimal power allocation when users know only their own channel (while perfect channel state information is assumed at the base station). This scenario illustrates the case of decentralized schemes, where limited information on the network is available at the terminal. Various receivers are considered, namely the matched filter, the MMSE filter and the optimum filter. The goal of this paper is to extend previous work, and to derive simple expressions for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium as the number of mobiles becomes large and the spreading length increases. To that end two asymptotic methodologies are combined. The first is asymptotic random matrix theory which allows us to obtain explicit expressions of the impact of all other mobiles on any given tagged mobile. The second is the theory of non-atomic games which computes good approximations of the Nash equilibrium as the number of mobiles grows. View full abstract»

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  • Competition Versus Cooperation on the MISO Interference Channel

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1059 - 1069
    Cited by:  Papers (126)  |  Patents (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (470 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider the problem of coordinating two competing multiple-antenna wireless systems (operators) that operate in the same spectral band. We formulate a rate region which is achievable by scalar coding followed by power allocation and beamforming. We show that all interesting points on the Pareto boundary correspond to transmit strategies where both systems use the maximum available power. We then argue that there is a fundamental need for base station cooperation when performing spectrum sharing with multiple transmit antennas. More precisely, we show that if the systems do not cooperate, there is a unique Nash equilibrium which is inefficient in the sense that the achievable rate is bounded by a constant, regardless of the available transmit power. An extension of this result to the case where the receivers use successive interference cancellation (SIC) is also provided. Next we model the problem of agreeing on beamforming vectors as a non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative gametheoretic problem, with the two operators as players. Specifically we compute numerically the Nash bargaining solution, which is a likely resolution of the resource conflict assuming that the players are rational. Numerical experiments indicate that selfish but cooperating operators may achieve a performance which is close to the maximum-sum-rate bound. View full abstract»

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  • Rate-Based Equilibria in Collision Channels with Fading

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1070 - 1077
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (410 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider a wireless collision channel, shared by a finite number of users who transmit to a common base station. Each user wishes to minimize its average transmission rate (or power investment), subject to minimum throughput demand. The channel quality between each user and the base station is randomly time-varying, and partially observed by the user through Channel State Information (CSI) signals. Assuming that all users employ stationary, CSI-dependent transmission policies, we investigate the properties of the Nash equilibrium of the resulting game between users. We characterize the feasible region of user's throughput demands, and provide lower bounds on the channel capacity that hold both for symmetric and non-symmetric users. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that, when the throughput demands are feasible, there exist exactly two Nash equilibrium points, with one strictly better than the other (in terms of power investment) for each user. We further demonstrate that the performance gap between the two equilibria may be arbitrarily large. This motivates the need for distributed mechanisms that lead to the better equilibrium. To that end, we suggest a simple greedy (best-response) mechanism, and prove convergence to the better equilibrium. Some important stability properties of this mechanism in face of changing user population are derived as well. View full abstract»

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  • Cooperative Game Theory and the Gaussian Interference Channel

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1078 - 1088
    Cited by:  Papers (42)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (808 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper we discuss the use of cooperative game theory for analyzing interference channels. We extend our previous work, to games with N players as well as frequency selective channels and joint TDM/FDM strategies. We show that the Nash bargaining solution can be computed using convex optimization techniques. We also show that the same results are applicable to interference channels where only statistical knowledge of the channel is available. Moreover, for the special case of two player 2 times K frequency selective channel (with K frequency bins) we provide an O(K log2 K) complexity algorithm for computing the Nash bargaining solution under mask constraint and using joint FDM/TDM strategies. Simulation results are also provided. View full abstract»

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  • Competitive Design of Multiuser MIMO Systems Based on Game Theory: A Unified View

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1089 - 1103
    Cited by:  Papers (88)  |  Patents (1)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (610 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper considers the noncooperative maximization of mutual information in the Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been studied in a number of papers during the past decade for the case of frequency-selective channels. A variety of conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and convergence of many different distributed algorithms have been derived. In this paper we provide a unified view of the state-of- the-art results, showing that most of the techniques proposed in the literature to study the game, even though apparently different, can be unified using our recent interpretation of the waterfilling operator as a projection onto a proper polyhedral set. Based on this interpretation, we then provide a mathematical framework, useful to derive a unified set of sufficient conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE and the global convergence of waterfilling based asynchronous distributed algorithms. The proposed mathematical framework is also instrumental to study the extension of the game to the more general MIMO case, for which only few results are available in the current literature. The resulting algorithm is, similarly to the frequency-selective case, an iterative asynchronous MIMO waterfilling algorithm. The proof of convergence hinges again on the interpretation of the MIMO waterfilling as a matrix projection, which is the natural generalization of our results obtained for the waterfilling mapping in the frequency-selective case. View full abstract»

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  • Coalitions in Cooperative Wireless Networks

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1104 - 1115
    Cited by:  Papers (46)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (662 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Cooperation between rational users in wireless networks is studied using coalitional game theory. Using the rate achieved by a user as its utility, it is shown that the stable coalition structure, i.e., set of coalitions from which users have no incentives to defect, depends on the manner in which the rate gains are apportioned among the cooperating users. Specifically, the stability of the grand coalition (GC), i.e., the coalition of all users, is studied. Transmitter and receiver cooperation in an interference channel (IC) are studied as illustrative cooperative models to determine the stable coalitions for both flexible (transferable) and fixed (non-transferable) apportioning schemes. It is shown that the stable sum-rate optimal coalition when only receivers cooperate by jointly decoding (transferable) is the GC. The stability of the GC depends on the detector when receivers cooperate using linear multiuser detectors (non-transferable). Transmitter cooperation is studied assuming that all receivers cooperate perfectly and that users outside a coalition act as jammers. The stability of the GC is studied for both the case of perfectly cooperating transmitters (transferrable) and under a partial decode-and-forward strategy (non-transferable). In both cases, the stability is shown to depend on the channel gains and the transmitter jamming strengths. View full abstract»

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  • A Game-Theoretic Framework for Medium Access Control

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1116 - 1127
    Cited by:  Papers (16)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (766 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, we generalize the random access game model, and show that it provides a general game- theoretic framework for designing contention based medium access control. We extend the random access game model to the network with multiple contention measure signals, study the design of random access games, and analyze different distributed algorithms achieving their equilibria. As examples, a series of utility functions is proposed for games achieving the maximum throughput in a network of homogeneous nodes. In a network with n traffic classes, an N-signal game model is proposed which achieves the maximum throughput under the fairness constraint among different traffic classes. In addition, the convergence of different dynamic algorithms such as best response, gradient play and Jacobi play under propagation delay and estimation error is established. Simulation results show that game model based protocols can achieve superior performance over the standard IEEE 802.11 DCF, and comparable performance as existing protocols with the best performance in literature. View full abstract»

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  • A Game Theoretic Framework of Distributed Power and Rate Control in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1128 - 1137
    Cited by:  Papers (17)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (600 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We present a game-theoretic study on the power and rate control problem in IEEE 802.11 WLANs where network participants choose appropriate transmission power and data rate to achieve maximum throughput with minimum energy consumption. In such game-theoretic study, the central issues are the existence, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE), the convergence to the NE and the system performance at the NE. We conduct our study for three specific games: the fixed-rate power control game GNPC, the fixed-power rate control game GNRC and the joint power rate control game GNJPRC. As main contributions, we establish the existence, uniqueness and convergence of the NE for the three games. In GNRC where the NE is inefficient, we provide pricing scheme to improve the efficiency. Based on our analysis on GNJPRC, we propose the joint power and rate control procedure to approach the NE which is proven to be social optimal. The procedure is distributed and simple to incorporate into the existing IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol. View full abstract»

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  • Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1138 - 1148
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (586 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. View full abstract»

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  • Joint Channel and Power Allocation in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Game Theoretical Perspective

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1149 - 1159
    Cited by:  Papers (26)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (574 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper addresses the throughput maximization problem in wireless mesh networks. For the case of cooperative access points, we present a negotiation-based throughput maximization algorithm which adjusts the operating channel and power level among access points automatically, from a game-theoretical perspective. We show that this algorithm converges to the optimal channel and power assignment which yields the maximum overall throughput with arbitrarily high probability. Moreover, we analyze the scenario where access points belong to different regulation entities and hence non-cooperative. The long- term behavior and corresponding performance are investigated and the analytical results are verified by simulations. View full abstract»

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  • Correlated Anarchy in Overlapping Wireless Networks

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1160 - 1169
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (466 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users start out completely uneducated and naive but, by using a fixed set of strategies to process a broadcasted training signal, they quickly evolve and converge to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Then, in order to measure efficiency in this steady state, we adapt the notion of the price of anarchy to our setting and we obtain an explicit analytic estimate for it by using methods from statistical physics (namely the theory of replicas). Surprisingly, we find that the price of anarchy does not depend on the specifics of the wireless nodes (e.g., spectral efficiency) but only on the number of strategies per user and a particular combination of the number of nodes, the number of users and the size of the training signal. Finally, we map this game to the well-studied minority game, generalizing its analysis to an arbitrary number of choices. View full abstract»

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  • Optimality and Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in the Coverage Game

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1170 - 1182
    Cited by:  Papers (9)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (492 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, we investigate the coverage problem in wireless sensor networks using a game theory method. We assume that nodes are randomly scattered in a sensor field and the goal is to partition these nodes into K sets. At any given time, nodes belonging to only one of these sets actively sense the field. A key challenge is to achieve this partition in a distributed manner with purely local information and yet provide near optimal coverage. We appropriately formulate this coverage problem as a coverage game and prove that the optimal solution is a pure Nash equilibrium. Then, we design synchronous and asynchronous algorithms, which converge to pure Nash equilibria. Moreover, we analyze the optimality and complexity of pure Nash equilibria in the coverage game. We prove that, the ratio between the optimal coverage and the worst case Nash equilibrium coverage, is upper bounded by 2 - 1/m+1 (m is the maximum number of nodes, which cover any point, in the Nash equilibrium solution s*). We prove that finding pure Nash equilibria in the general coverage game is PLS-complete, i.e. "as hard as that of finding a local optimum in any local search problem with efficient computable neighbors". Finally, via extensive simulations, we show that, the Nash equilibria coverage performance is very close to the optimal coverage and the convergence speed is sublinear. Even under the noisy environment, our algorithms can still converge to the pure Nash equilibria. View full abstract»

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  • Optimal Competitive Algorithms for Opportunistic Spectrum Access

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1183 - 1192
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (502 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) strategies for a transmitter in a multichannel wireless system, where a channel may or may not be available and the transmitter must sense/probe the channel to find out before transmission. Applications for this work include joint probing and transmission for a secondary user in a cognitive radio network. Limited by resources, e.g., energy and time, the transmitter must decide on a subset of a potentially very large number of channels to probe and can only use for transmission those that have been found to be available. In contrast to previous works, we do not assume the user has a priori knowledge regarding the statistics of channel states. The main goal of this work is to design robust strategies that decide, based only on knowledge of the channel bandwidths/data rates, which channels to probe. We derive optimal strategies that maximize the total expected bandwidth/data rate in the worst-case, via a performance measure in the form of a competitive regret (ratio) between the average performance of a strategy and a genie (or omniscient observer). This formulation can also be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game between the user and an adversary which chooses the channel state that minimizes the useriquests gain. We show that our results correspond to a Nash equilibrium (in the form of a mixed strategy) in this game. We examine the performance of the optimal strategies under a wide range of system parameters and practical channel models via numerical studies. View full abstract»

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  • Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1193 - 1203
    Cited by:  Papers (23)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (513 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource via a sequential second-price auction. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. For two users with full information, we show that such an auction has a unique equilibrium allocation. The worst-case efficiency of this allocation is characterized under the following cases: (i) both bidders have a concave valuation for the spectrum resource, and (ii) one bidder has a concave valuation and the other bidder has a convex valuation (e.g., for the other useriquests power). Although the worst-case efficiency loss can be significant, numerical results are presented, which show that for randomly placed transmitter-receiver pairs with rate utility functions, the sequential second-price auction typically achieves the efficient allocation. For more than two users it is shown that this mechanism always has a pure strategy equilibrium, but in general there may be multiple equilibria. We give a constructive procedure for finding one equilibrium; numerical results show that when all users have concave valuations the efficiency loss decreases with an increase in the number of users. View full abstract»

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  • A game theoretical framework for dynamic pricing-based routing in self-organized MANETs

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1204 - 1217
    Cited by:  Papers (10)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (599 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) where each user is its own authority, fully cooperative behaviors, such as unconditionally forwarding packets for each other or honestly revealing its private information, cannot be directly assumed. The pricing mechanism is one way to provide incentives for the users to act cooperatively by awarding some payment for cooperative behaviors. In this paper, we consider efficient routing in self-organized MANETs and model it as multi-stage dynamic pricing games. A game theoretical framework for dynamic pricing-based routing in MANETs is proposed to maximize the sender/receiveriquests payoff by considering the dynamic nature of MANETs. Meanwhile, the forwarding incentives of the relay nodes can also be maintained by optimally pricing their packet-forwarding services based on the auction rules and introducing the cartel maintenance enforcing mechanism. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed dynamic pricing-based routing approach has significant performance gains over the existing static pricing approaches. View full abstract»

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  • Adaptive Routing Strategies in IEEE 802.16 Multi-Hop Wireless Backhaul Networks Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1218 - 1225
    Cited by:  Papers (6)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (783 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The high frequency segment (10-66 GHz) of the IEEE 802.16 standard seems promising for the implementation of wireless backhaul networks carrying large volumes of Internet traffic. In contrast to wireline backbone networks, where channel errors seldom occur, routing decisions in IEEE 802.16 networks are conditioned by wireless channel impairments rather than by congestion, exclusively. This renders a cross-layer routing approach between the routing and the physical layers more appropriate during fading periods. In this paper, an adaptive cross-layer routing scheme is presented based on the selection of the most reliable path in terms of packet error ratio (unipath routing). The paper argues that routing Internet traffic through wireless backhaul networks is modeled more realistically employing evolutionary rather than conventional game theory. The stability of the proposed routing algorithm is proven and the dependence of the speed of convergence on various physical layer parameters is investigated. Is is also shown that convergence may be further accelerated by increasing the amount of information from the physical layer, specifically the physical separation between the alternative paths provided to the routing layer. View full abstract»

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  • Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Cooperative Communications

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1226 - 1237
    Cited by:  Papers (64)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (660 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Distributed and efficient resource allocation is critical for fully realizing the benefits of cooperative communications in large scale communication networks. This paper proposes two auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, that determine relay selection and relay power allocation in a distributed fashion. A single-relay network is considered first, and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (i.e., the auction's outcome) are proved. It is shown that the power auction achieves the efficient allocation by maximizing the total rate increase, and the SNR auction is flexible in trading off fairness and efficiency. For both auctions, the distributed best response bid updates globally converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium in a completely asynchronous manner. The analysis is then generalized to networks with multiple relays, and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium is shown under appropriate conditions. Simulation results verify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed algorithms. View full abstract»

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  • Designing Multicast Protocols for Non-Cooperative Networks

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1238 - 1249
    Cited by:  Papers (8)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (298 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities are selfish: they will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contributing to the network by following the prescribed protocols. Thus, new protocols should be designed for the non-cooperative network that is composed of selfish entities. In this paper, we specifically show how to design truthful multicast protocols for non-cooperative networks such that these selfish entities will follow the protocols out of their own interests. By assuming that every entity has a fixed cost for a specific multicast, we give a general framework to decide whether it is possible and how, if possible, to transform an existing multicast protocol to a truthful multicast protocol by designing a proper payment protocol. We then show how the payments to those relay entities are shared fairly among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers. As running examples, we show how to design truthful multicast protocols for several multicast structures that are currently used in practice. View full abstract»

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  • A Game-Theoretical Study of Robust Networked Systems

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1250 - 1259
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (537 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper analyses the robustness of networked systems from a game-theoretical perspective. Networked systems often consist of several subsystems sharing resources interdependently based on local preferences. These systems can be modelled by a dependence game, which is a generalisation of stable paths problem. A unique pure Nash equilibrium in a dependence game can characterise the robustness of the represented networked system, precluding oscillations and nondeterminism. We show that the absence of a structure termed a generalised dispute wheel is useful to ensure the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider more sophisticated settings: tie-breaking over non-strict preferences and asynchronous communications among subsystems. We also obtain stronger results that the absence of a generalised dispute wheel can be useful to ensure the consistency of tie-breaking and asynchronous convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. View full abstract»

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  • Inefficient Noncooperation in Networking Games of Common-Pool Resources

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1260 - 1268
    Cited by:  Papers (8)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (385 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We study in this paper a noncooperative approach for sharing resources of a common pool among users, wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The optimality notion is then a Nash equilibrium. First, we present a general framework of systems wherein a Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, which are similar to the 'tragedy of the commons' in economics. As examples that fit in the above framework, we consider noncooperative flow-control problems in communication networks where each user decides its throughput to optimize its own utility. As such a utility, we first consider the power which is defined as the throughput divided by the expected end-to-end packet delay, and then consider another utility of additive costs. For both utilities, we establish the non-efficiency of the Nash equilibria. View full abstract»

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  • The Price of Simplicity

    Publication Year: 2008 , Page(s): 1269 - 1276
    Cited by:  Papers (17)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (398 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We study revenue-maximizing pricing by a service provider in a communication network and compare revenues from simple pricing rules to the maximum revenues that are feasible. In particular, we focus on flat entry fees as the simplest pricing rule. We provide a lower bound for the ratio between the revenue from this pricing rule and maximum revenue, which we refer to as the price of simplicity. We characterize what types of environments lead to a low price of simplicity and show that in a range of environments, the loss of revenue from using simple entry fees is small. We then study the price of simplicity for a simple non-linear pricing (price discrimination) scheme based on the Paris Metro Pricing. The service provider creates different service classes and charges differential entry fees for these classes. We show that the gain from this type of price discrimination is small, particularly in environments in which the simple entry fee pricing leads to a low price of simplicity. View full abstract»

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Aims & Scope

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications focuses on all telecommunications, including telephone, telegraphy, facsimile, and point-to-point television, by electromagnetic propagation.

Full Aims & Scope

Meet Our Editors

Editor-in-Chief
Muriel Médard
MIT