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Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Issue 5 • Date May 2006

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Displaying Results 1 - 21 of 21
  • Table of contents

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): c1 - c4
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  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications publication information

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): c2
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  • Guest Editorial Price-Based Access Control and Economics of Networking

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 937 - 941
    Cited by:  Papers (1)
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  • Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 942 - 951
    Cited by:  Papers (11)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (432 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    One of the challenges facing the networking industry today is to increase the profitability of Internet services. This calls for economic mechanisms that can enable providers to charge more for better services and collect a fair share of the increased revenues. In this paper, we present a generic pricing model for Internet services jointly offered by a group of providers. We show that noncooperative pricing strategies may lead to unfair distribution of profit and may even discourage future upgrades to the network. As an alternative, we propose a fair revenue-sharing policy based on the weighted proportional fairness criterion. We show that this fair allocation policy encourages collaboration among providers, and hence can produce higher profits for all providers. Based on the analysis, we suggest a scalable algorithm for providers to implement this policy in a distributed way and study its convergence property. View full abstract»

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  • Charge sensitive and incentive compatible end-to-end window-based control for selfish users

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 952 - 961
    Cited by:  Papers (4)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (480 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper considers the problem of finding a tamper-resistant and charge-sensitive end-to-end window flow-control mechanism for greedy users. Using a mathematical model of resource distribution, we propose a distributed window flow-control mechanism leading to a flow-rate vector which achieves maximum total utility. Desirable features of the proposed window control algorithm and properties of the equilibrium points are explored. We also prove the convergence of the proposed window control algorithm. View full abstract»

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  • Price-based distributed algorithms for rate-reliability tradeoff in network utility maximization

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 962 - 976
    Cited by:  Papers (57)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (624 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The current framework of network utility maximization for rate allocation and its price-based algorithms assumes that each link provides a fixed-size transmission "pipe" and each user's utility is a function of transmission rate only. These assumptions break down in many practical systems, where, by adapting the physical layer channel coding or transmission diversity, different tradeoffs between rate and reliability can be achieved. In network utility maximization problems formulated in this paper, the utility for each user depends on both transmission rate and signal quality, with an intrinsic tradeoff between the two. Each link may also provide a higher (or lower) rate on the transmission "pipes" by allowing a higher (or lower) decoding error probability. Despite nonseparability and nonconvexity of these optimization problems, we propose new price-based distributed algorithms and prove their convergence to the globally optimal rate-reliability tradeoff under readily-verifiable sufficient conditions. We first consider networks in which the rate-reliability tradeoff is controlled by adapting channel code rates in each link's physical-layer error correction codes, and propose two distributed algorithms based on pricing, which respectively implement the "integrated" and "differentiated" policies of dynamic rate-reliability adjustment. In contrast to the classical price-based rate control algorithms, in our algorithms, each user provides an offered price for its own reliability to the network, while the network provides congestion prices to users. The proposed algorithms converge to a tradeoff point between rate and reliability, which we prove to be a globally optimal one for channel codes with sufficiently large coding length and utilities whose curvatures are sufficiently negative. Under these conditions, the proposed algorithms can thus generate the Pareto optimal tradeoff curves between rate and reliability for all the users. In addition, the distributed algorithms and convergence proofs are extended for wireless multiple-inpit-multiple-output multihop networks, in which diversity and multiplexing gains of each link are controlled to achieve the optimal rate-reliability tradeoff. Numerical examples confirm that there can be significant enhancement of the n- etwork utility by distributively trading-off rate and reliability, even when only some of the links can implement dynamic reliability. View full abstract»

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  • Efficiency and Braess' Paradox under pricing in general networks

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 977 - 991
    Cited by:  Papers (3)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (584 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We study the flow control and routing decisions of self-interested users in a general congested network where a single profit-maximizing service provider sets prices for different paths in the network. We define an equilibrium of the user choices. We then define the monopoly equilibrium (ME) as the equilibrium prices set by the service provider and the corresponding user equilibrium. We analyze the networks containing different types of user utilities: elastic or inelastic. For a network containing inelastic user utilities, we show the flow allocations at the ME and the social optimum are the same. For a network containing elastic user utilities, we explicitly characterize the ME and study its performance relative to the user equilibrium at 0 prices and the social optimum that would result from centrally maximizing the aggregate system utility. We also define Braess' Paradox for a network involving pricing and show that Braess' Paradox does not occur under monopoly prices. View full abstract»

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  • A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 992 - 999
    Cited by:  Papers (20)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (296 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The design of pricing mechanisms for network resource allocation has two important objectives: 1) a simple and scalable end-to-end implementation and 2) efficiency of the resulting equilibria. Both objectives are met by certain recently proposed mechanisms when users are price taking, but not when users can anticipate the effects of their actions on the resulting prices. In this paper, we partially close this gap, by demonstrating an alternative resource allocation mechanism which is scalable and guarantees a fully efficient allocation when users are price taking. In addition, when links have affine marginal cost, this mechanism has efficiency loss bounded by 1/3 when users are price anticipating. These results are derived by studying Cournot games, and in the process we derive the first nontrivial constant factor bounds on efficiency loss in these well-studied economic models. View full abstract»

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  • Efficient signal proportional allocation (ESPA) mechanisms: decentralized social welfare maximization for divisible resources

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1000 - 1009
    Cited by:  Papers (9)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (456 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We address the problem of devising efficient decentralized allocation mechanisms for a divisible resource, which is critical to many technological domains such as traffic management on the Internet and bandwidth allocation to agents in ad hoc wireless networks. We introduce a class of efficient signal proportional allocation (ESPA) mechanisms that yields an allocation which maximizes social welfare with minimal signaling and computational requirements for the resource. Revenue limits for this class are obtained and a sequence of schemes that approach these limits arbitrarily closely are given. We also present a locally stable negotiation scheme applicable to the entire class and illustrate efficiency and revenue properties through simulation. View full abstract»

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  • Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1010 - 1019
    Cited by:  Papers (79)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (448 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We devise a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and free-identities in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's willingness to contribute resources to the system. A user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current contribution cost in the system compares to her type. We study the impact of mechanisms that exclude low type users or, more realistically, penalize free-riders with degraded service. We also consider dynamic scenarios with arrivals and departures of users, and with whitewashers -users who leave the system and rejoin with new identities to avoid reputational penalties. We find that imposing penalty on all users that join the system is effective under many scenarios. In particular, system performance degrades significantly only when the turnover rate among users is high. Finally, we show that the optimal exclusion or penalty level differs significantly from the level that optimizes the performance of contributors only for a limited range of societal generosity levels. View full abstract»

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  • Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad hoc networks

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1020 - 1033
    Cited by:  Papers (14)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (520 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In third-generation (3G) wireless data networks, repeated requests for popular data items can exacerbate the already scarce wireless spectrum. In this paper, we propose an architectural and protocol framework that allows 3G service providers to host efficient content distribution services. We offload the spectrum intensive task of content distribution to an ad hoc network. Less mobile users (resident subscribers) are provided incentives to cache popular data items, while mobile users (transit subscribers) access this data from resident subscribers through the ad hoc network. Since the participants of this data distribution network act as selfish agents, they may collude to maximize their individual payoff. Our proposed protocol discourages potential collusion scenarios. In this architecture, the goal (social function) of the 3G service provider is to have the selfishly motivated resident subscribers service as many data requests as possible. However, the choice of which set of items to cache is left to the individual user. The caching activity among the different users can be modeled as a market sharing game. In this work, we study the Nash equilibria of market sharing games and the performance of such equilibria in terms of a social function. These games are a special case of congestion games that have been studied in the economics literature. In particular, pure strategy Nash equilibria for this set of games exist. We give a polynomial-time algorithm to find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a special case, while it is NP-hard to do so in the general case. As for the performance of Nash equilibria, we show that the price of anarchy-the worst case ratio between the social function at any Nash equilibrium and at the social optimum-can be upper bounded by a factor of 2. When the popularity follows a Zipf distribution, the price of anarchy is bounded by 1.45 in the special case where caching any item has a positive reward for all players. We prove that the selfish behavior of computationally bounded agents converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium in a finite number of improvements. Furthermore, we prove that, after each agent computes its response function once using a constant factor approximation algorithm, the outcome of the game is within a factor of- O(logn) of the optimal social value, where n is the number of agents. Our simulation scenarios show that the price of anarchy is 30% better than that of the worst case analysis and that the system quickly (1 or 2 steps) converges to a Nash equilibrium. View full abstract»

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  • Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1034 - 1050
    Cited by:  Papers (16)  |  Patents (7)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (496 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private preferences for the good. The cost of provisioning the good in quantity Q depends on Q, and may also depend on n, or on the final number of participating peers m. Our aim is to maximize the expected social welfare in a way that is incentive compatible, rational and budget-balanced. Although it is unfortunately almost never possible to calculate or implement a truely optimal mechanism design, we show that as the number of participants becomes large the expected social welfare that can be obtained by the optimal design is at most a factor 1+O(1/n) or 1+O(1/√n) greater than that which can be obtained with a very simple scheme that requires only payment of a fixed contribution from any agent who joins the system as a participating peer. Our first application is to a model of file sharing, in which the public good is content availability; the second concerns a problem of peering wireless local area networks, in which the public good is the availability of connectivity for roaming peers. In both problems, we can cope with the requirement that the payments be made in kind, rather than in cash. View full abstract»

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  • Smart pay access control via incentive alignment

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1051 - 1060
    Cited by:  Papers (3)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (424 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We use game theoretic models to show the lack of incentives in the transport control protocol congestion avoidance algorithm and the consequential system-wide network problems. We then propose a Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism-based access control mechanism for packet traffic. Our mechanism is called "smart pay access control (SPAC)". We prove both the incentive compatibility and individual rationality of SPAC, which achieves Pareto efficient allocation of network resource. The computing problems are NP-hard for the general VCG mechanism, whereas our mechanism computes the winner's determination problem as fast as a sorting algorithm. The speed of SPAC makes it feasible for the real world usage. As a positive side effect, the mechanism provides the base for a pricing scheme, which we present in the context of the differentiated service architecture for the Internet. View full abstract»

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  • Design differentiated service multicast with selfish agents

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1061 - 1073
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (573 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the quality-of-service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link e/sub i/ is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient c/sub i/ such that the cost of e/sub i/ to provide a transmission service with bandwidth demand x is c/sub i//spl middot/x. Further, we assume that there is a fixed source node s and a set R of receivers, each of which requires from s data with a minimum bandwidth demand. The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a link-weighted tree rooted at s and spanning R such that the receivers' demands are met. This generalizes the traditional link-weighted Steiner tree problem. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than eight times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomial-time computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully. View full abstract»

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  • Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1074 - 1084
    Cited by:  Papers (272)  |  Patents (4)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (584 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider a distributed power control scheme for wireless ad hoc networks, in which each user announces a price that reflects compensation paid by other users for their interference. We present an asynchronous distributed algorithm for updating power levels and prices. By relating this algorithm to myopic best response updates in a fictitious game, we are able to characterize convergence using supermodular game theory. Extensions of this algorithm to a multichannel network are also presented, in which users can allocate their power across multiple frequency bands. View full abstract»

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  • Wireless channel allocation using an auction algorithm

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1085 - 1096
    Cited by:  Papers (62)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (424 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the second-price auction mechanism whereby user bids for the channel, during each time slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the highest bid wins use of the channel by paying the second highest bid. Under the assumption that each user has a limited budget for bidding, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy, and the Nash equilibrium leads to a unique allocation for certain channel state distribution, such as the exponential distribution and the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For uniformly distributed channel state, we establish that the aggregate throughput received by the users using the Nash equilibrium strategy is at least 3/4 of what can be obtained using an optimal centralized allocation that does not take fairness into account. We also show that the Nash equilibrium strategy leads to an allocation that is Pareto optimal (i.e., it is impossible to make some users better off without making some other users worse off). Based on the Nash equilibrium strategies of the second-price auction with money constraint, we further propose a centralized opportunistic scheduler that does not suffer the shortcomings associated with the proportional fair scheduler. View full abstract»

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  • Special issue on cross-layer optimized wireless communications

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1097
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  • Special issue on non-cooperative behavior in networking

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1098
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  • Special issue on optimization of MIMO transceivers for realistic communication networks: Challenges and opportunities

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1099
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  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications Information for authors

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): 1100
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    Freely Available from IEEE
  • IEEE Communications Society Information

    Publication Year: 2006 , Page(s): c3
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    Freely Available from IEEE

Aims & Scope

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications focuses on all telecommunications, including telephone, telegraphy, facsimile, and point-to-point television, by electromagnetic propagation.

Full Aims & Scope

Meet Our Editors

Editor-in-Chief
Muriel Médard
MIT