5 !S1 S2: Even If Robots Cannot Have Rights, Robots Should Have Rights

The final modality also supports the independence and asymmetry of the two statements, but it does so by denying the first and affirming the second. In this case, which is something proposed and developed by Kate Darling (2012 and 2016a), robots, at least in term of the currently available technology, cannot have rights. They do not, at least at this particular point in time, possess the necessary capabilities or properties to be considered full moral and legal subjects. Despite this fact, there is, Darling asserts, something qualitatively different about the way we encounter and perceive robots, especially social robots. “Looking at state of the art technology, our robots are nowhere close to the intelligence and complexity of humans or animals, nor will they reach this stage in the near future. And yet, while it seems far-fetched for a robot's legal status to differ from that of a toaster,
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there is already a notable difference in how we interact with certain types of robotic objects” (Darling 2012, 1). This occurs, Darling continues, principally due to our tendencies to anthropomorphize things by projecting onto them cognitive capabilities, emotions, and motivations that do not necessarily exist. Socially interactive robots, in particular, are intentionally designed to leverage and manipulate this proclivity. “Social robots,” Darling (2012, 1) explains, “play off of this tendency by mimicking cues that we automatically associate with certain states of mind or feelings. Even in today's primitive form, this can elicit emotional reactions from people that are similar, for instance, to how we react to animals and to each other.” And it is this emotional reaction, Darling argues, that necessitates obligations in the face of social robots. “Given that many people already feel strongly about state-of-the-art social robot ‘abuse,' it may soon become more widely perceived as out of line with our social values to treat robotic companions in a way that we would not treat our pets” (Darling 2012, 1).