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Statistical attack against fuzzy commitment scheme

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2 Author(s)
Rathgeb, C. ; Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria ; Uhl, A.

In this study a statistical attack against fuzzy commitment schemes is presented. Comparisons of different pairs of binary biometric feature vectors yield binomial distributions, the standard deviations of which are bounded by the entropy of biometric templates. In case error correction consists of a series of chunks, like in the vast majority of approaches, helper data become vulnerable to statistical attacks. Error-correction codewords are bound to separate parts of a binary template among which biometric entropy is dispersed. As a consequence, chunks of the helper data are prone to statistical significant false acceptance. In experimental evaluations the proposed attack is applied to different iris-biometric fuzzy commitment schemes retrieving cryptographic keys at alarming low effort.

Published in:

Biometrics, IET  (Volume:1 ,  Issue: 2 )