I. Introduction
Achieving interconnection and ensuring security in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) requires significant effort in the reverse engineering of industrial control protocols [1]. Various companies and organizations have developed their proprietary protocols, such as Schneider’s Modbus [2], Siemens’ S7Communication [3], and ODVA’s EthernetIP/CIP [4]. Furthermore, within the same company, the introduction of new equipment or updates often leads to the development of non-public protocol variants, such as the disclosed version 0x32 and the unpublished version 0x72 in S7Communication. Given the diverse range of equipment and facilities used in IIoT systems, understanding the protocols employed by each device is crucial for establishing effective communication connectivity within the system. In addition, the process of updating old equipment and formulating new protocols is often slow and expensive. While the OPC series protocols [5] have made significant efforts and achieved commendable results over the past decade, there remains a considerable demand for the reverse engineering of industrial control protocols. Moreover, security research conducted on IIoT systems and equipment heavily relies on known protocol specifications [6]. For instance, knowledge of these protocols enables the generation of random messages for fuzzing purposes. Therefore, obtaining detailed insights into the protocols utilized in IIoT is essential for both communication functionality and security analysis [7].