Information Theoretic Secure Aggregation with User Dropouts

In the robust secure aggregation problem, a server wishes to learn and only learn the sum of the inputs of a number of users while some users may drop out (i.e., may not respond). The identity of the dropped users is not known a priori and the server needs to securely recover the sum of the remaining surviving users. We consider the following minimal two-round model of secure aggregation. Over the first round, any set of no fewer than
$U$
users out of
$K$
users respond to the server and the server wants to learn the sum of the inputs of all responding users. The remaining users are viewed as dropped. Over the second round, any set of no fewer than
$U$
users of the surviving users respond (i.e., dropouts are still possible over the second round) and from the information obtained from the surviving users over the two rounds, the server can decode the desired sum. The security constraint is that even if the server colludes with any
$T$
users and the messages from the dropped users are received by the server (e.g., delayed packets), the server is not able to infer any additional information beyond the sum in the information theoretic sense. For this information theoretic secure aggregation problem, we characterize the optimal communication cost. When
$U\leq T$
, secure aggregation is not feasible, and when
$U > T$
, to securely compute one symbol of the sum, the minimum number of symbols sent from each user to the server is 1 over the first round, and
$1/(U-T)$
over the second round.