G-SIR: An Insider Attack Resilient Geo-Social Access Control Framework

Insider attacks are among the most dangerous and costly attacks to organizations. These attacks are carried out by individuals who are legitimately authorized to access the system. Preventing insider attacks is a daunting task. The recent proliferation of social media and mobile devices offer new opportunities to collect geo-social information that can help in detecting and deterring insider attacks. In particular, such geo-social information allows us to better understand the context and behavior of users. In this paper, we propose a Geo-Social Insider Threat Resilient Access Control Framework (G-SIR) to deter insider threats by including current and historic geo-social information as part of the access control decision process. We include policy constraints to manage the risks of colluding communities, proximity threats, and suspicious users while leveraging the presence of users around the requester to make an access decision. By examining users' geo-social behavior, we can detect those users whose access behavior deviates from the expected patterns; such suspicious behaviors can point to potential insider attackers who may deliberately or inadvertently carry out malicious activities. We use such information to establish how trustworthy a user is before granting access. We evaluate the G-SIR framework through extensive simulations and our results show that the proposed approach is efficient, scalable and effective.