A ‘wicked problem’ — Predicting sos behaviour in tactical land combat with compromised C4ISR

Military command and control networks exist in the context of System of Systems. In a near-peer land combat environment, the benefits conferred to a commander by a networked command and control system make that network a highly desirable cyber target. This paper contends that the successful compromise of a command and control system, in conjunction with an integrated deception plan, leads to the degradation of a decision maker's trust in the system and the information it provides. However, a highly effective and integrated deception plan will not degrade the decision makers trust until a combat outcome has been obtained, thus obtaining surprise. Therefore, a cyber attack on a command and control network must be orchestrated for maximum benefit through the integration of deception effects. The solution to this wicked problem rests in the management of risk and the resolution of the paradox of cyber dependence.