Social and political perspectives on nuclear regulation after three mile Island

The near catastrophic accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania in March 1979 prompted policymakers and government officials in the United States to closely examine the regulation of nuclear power, and a host of studies, panels, and special commissions were launched to examine the issue intensively. While the results are currently pouring in seemingly from everyone, the advice and recommendations have a remarkable similarity about them. For example, a study of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the United Stales General Accounting Office offered some fairly typical recommendations. Il concluded that the NRC's “performance can be characterized as slow, indecisive, cautious — in a word, complacent.” The report said this resulted from a “lack of aggressive leadership as evidenced by the Commissioners' failures to establish regulatory goals, control policy making, and most importantly, clearly define their roles in nuclear regulation.” Several regulatory reforms were suggested to bring about “effective and efficient regulation to the future of commercial nuclear activities,” [1] To be sure, almost everyone, including the influential President's Commission on Three Mile Island, believes there ought to be some kind, if not drastic, reform in nuclear power's administrative and regulatory machinery. [2]