A Task Offloading Incentive Mechanism for Vehicle Platoon in Intelligent Transportation System

In Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), the concept of vehicle platoon is considered as a promising way to alleviate air pollution, reduce energy consumption and promote green and low-carbon development. Moreover, a vehicle platoon is capable of form rich computational to elegantly address the small-scale offloading tasks on the highway in time. It is effectively avoid the intolerable transmission and processing delay cause by offloading tasks to mobile edge computing unit (MEC). However, regarding rationality and selfishness, the platoon may not want to participate in the offloaded task unless it gets satisfactorily rewarded to make up for its resource consumption. To this end, an effective joint task offloading and resource allocation incentive mechanism (TRIM) is constructed in this paper. Among them, a two-stage Stackelberg game is designed to stimulate the platoon to tackle the offloading tasks, while maximizing the utilities of the task unloader. At the same time, in this proposed game, the optimal computing pricing and trading amount strategies can be derived. The rigorous analysis and performance evaluation results reveal that our TRIM is effective and practical in motivating a platoon to resolve the task.