SASIMI: Evaluation Board for EM Information Leakage from Large Scale Cryptographic Circuits

In this paper, we propose a common evaluation board(Side-channel Attack Standard IMplementation and eval-uatIon board: SASIMI) for the threat of acquiring information leaked from electromagnetic(EM) noise generated by devices. To prevent this threat, it is necessary to implement circuits that do not leak secret information, like a secret key, via EM side-channel, and conduct actual measurement and evaluation environment, which makes it difficult for a third party to reproduce the results. However, since captured EM activity is affected by the surrounding EM noise, the evaluation results may vary depending on the evaluation environment. The proposed evaluation board can implement various cryp-tographic circuits. The IC must be capable of reconfiguring logic and implementing large-scale cryptographic blocks such as post quantum cryptography. To reduce the influence of environmental EM noise, an independent power supply network and measurement port are provided for the IC to be evaluated thus improving the measurement reproducibility. In order to evaluate the performance of the SASIMI board, this paper proposes an index to evaluate the strength of the information of the secret key contained in the power supply noise. This index is to find the value of the resistance to be inserted into the power supply network of the prototype board. Measurement results show that the simple amplitude value of EM noise and the intensity of information leakage do not necessarily coincide.