ARMISTICE: Microarchitectural Leakage Modeling for Masked Software Formal Verification

Side-channel attacks are powerful attacks for retrieving secret data by exploiting physical measurements, such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. Masking is a popular countermeasure as it can be proven secure against an attacker model. In practice, software-masked implementations suffer from a security reduction due to a mismatch between the considered leakage sources in the security proof and the real ones, which depend on the microarchitecture. We propose ARMISTICE, a framework for formally verifying the absence of leakage in first-order masked implementations taking into account modeled microarchitectural sources of leakage. As a proof of concept, we present the modeling of an Arm Cortex-M3 core from its RTL description and leakage test vectors, as well as the modeling of the memory of an STM32F1 board, exclusively using leakage test vectors. We show that, with these models, ARMISTICE pinpoints vulnerable instructions in real-world masked implementations and helps the design of masked software implementations which are practically secure.