State Estimation for Cyber-Seaport Microgrid under False Data Injection Attacks

With the rapid development of electrified seaports and all-electric ships, power systems and sensor networks are more closely integrated now, which makes the cyber-security challenges faced by DC Cyber-Seaport Microgrids (CSM) with highly coupled physical information more serious. The false data injection attack is a very common attack method in power grids and IoTs, but few researchers have studied false data injection attacks in CSM. Therefore, the conditions under which the DC CSM can be successfully attacked and the changes of current and voltage under the attack are promising research directions. In this paper, we equate the DC CSM to a simple DC circuit model and represent the state equation of the model as a linear time-invariant discrete form. On this basis, a steady-state Kalman filter is designed to estimate the actual current and voltage variations of the model. Through simulations, we confirm that under certain conditions, at least one attack sequence exists, which can cause the current and voltage of the DC CSM model to deviate greatly from the normal state, however, this attack sequence is not alerted by the detector. In addition, we give preliminary suggestions on how to protect the system.