INCENTIVE-BASED MANAGEMENT OF MULTIAGENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS IN CONTINGENCY CONDITIONS

Multi-agent distribution systems, which are primarily developed by introduction of privatization and restructuring in power systems, compose of agents independently scheduling their respective resources as well as distribution system operators (DSOs) responsible for reliable operation of the distribution grids. In this regard, failure of network components in distribution systems could result in significant economic loss for DSOs as well as degrading the reliability of the load demands. Consequently, this paper aims to provide a novel framework in which the economic loss associated with the contingency conditions as well as power loss during the repairing state of the distribution grid decrease. In the proposed framework, utilities provide incentives to agents collaborated in supplying the isolated load demands as well as decreasing the operational costs of the grid during the contingency condition. Accordingly, Stackelberg game concept is utilized to determine the incentive control signals employed by DSO to exploit agents' operational scheduling during the contingency condition. Moreover, the proposed scheme is adjusted by the distributed structure of multi-agent systems to address the privacy concerns of the independent agents. Finally, the developed framework is implemented on the IEEE-33-test-system in order to investigate its effectiveness in resource scheduling during contingency conditions.