Game-Theoretic Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Mobile Edge Computing

The network attack such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack could be critical to latency-critical systems such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) as such attacks significantly increase the response delay of the victim service. Intrusion prevention system (IPS) is a promising solution to defend against such attacks, but there will be a trade-off between IPS deployment and application resource reservation as the deployment of IPS will reduce the number of computation resources for MEC applications. In this paper, we proposed a game-theoretic framework to study the joint computation resource allocation and IPS deployment in the MEC architecture. We study the pricing strategy of the MEC platform operator and purchase strategy of the application service provider, given the expected attack strength and end user demands. The best responses of both MPO and ASPs are derived theoretically to identify the Stackelberg equilibrium. The simulation results confirm that the proposed solutions significantly increase the social welfare of the system.