Experimental Validation of a Market-based Remedial Action Coping with Cyberattackers Targeting Renewable-based Microgrids

This paper presents a framework to perform experimental validation of a remedial action for a lab-scale microgrid targeted by false data injection (FDI) cyberattack. The microgrid, which is located at Southern Illinois University (SIU), Carbondale, IL, USA, is managed to operate based on an electricity market mechanism. The corresponding renewable-based distributed generation (DG) owners submit their packages (i.e., power/bid) to be evaluated by market operator aiming at minimizing the total cost. Targeting the system by an FDI cyberattack, an attacker manipulates the submitted package associated with one of the DG owners at a specific time. After experiencing the attack, the operator reacts to the suspicious DG via excluding it from the market. Then, an invitation signal will be submitted to the non-attacked DG owners such that they can rapidly re-dispatch their generation in a secondary market to cope with the shortage of supply associated with the attacked DG.