AWA: Adversarial Website Adaptation

One of the most important obligations of privacy-enhancing technologies is to bring confidentiality and privacy to users' browsing activities on the Internet. The website fingerprinting attack enables a local passive eavesdropper to predict the target user's browsing activities even she uses anonymous technologies, such as VPNs, IPsec, and Tor. Recently, the growth of deep learning empowers adversaries to conduct the website fingerprinting attack with higher accuracy. In this paper, we propose a new defense against website fingerprinting attack using adversarial deep learning approaches called Adversarial Website Adaptation (AWA). AWA creates a transformer set in each run so that each website has a unique transformer. Each transformer generates adversarial traces to evade the adversary's classifier. AWA has two versions, including Universal AWA (UAWA) and Non-Universal AWA (NUAWA). Unlike NUAWA, there is no need to access the entire trace of a website in order to generate an adversarial trace in UAWA. We accommodate secret random elements in the training phase of transformers in order for AWA to generate various sets of transformers in each run. We run AWA several times and create multiple sets of transformers. If an adversary and a target user select different sets of transformers, the accuracy of adversary's classifier is almost 19.52% and 31.94% with almost 22.28% and 26.28% bandwidth overhead in UAWA and NUAWA, respectively. If a more powerful adversary generates adversarial traces through multiple sets of transformers and trains a classifier on them, the accuracy of adversary's classifier is almost 49.10% and 25.93% with almost 62.52% and 64.33% bandwidth overhead in UAWA and NUAW, respectively.