Jamming on Remote Estimation Over Wireless Links Under Faded Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach

This brief studies the transmission strategies of remote estimation over wireless channels subject to fading phenomenon within the framework of a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game. A smart sensor sends local estimates to a remote estimator via a stochastic time-varying faded channel, through which a jammer disrupts the signal transmission by injecting a high energy noise after observing the sensor's action. To balance energy consummation and estimation accuracy, a two-player general-sum noncooperative game is built on the infinite-time horizon, and is further transformed into a finite state Markov game according to data loss information. Then the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium of the Markov game is shown and a multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm is used to establish Stackelberg equilibrium strategies. Moreover, a numerical example is included to show the effectiveness of the current method.