Toward a Trustable, Self-Hosting Computer System

Due to the extremely rapid growth of the computing and IT technology market, commercial hardware made for the civilian, consumer sector is increasingly (and inevitably) deployed in security-sensitive environments. With the growing threat of hardware Trojans and backdoors, an adversary could perpetrate a full system compromise, or privilege escalation attack, even if the software is presumed to be perfectly secure. We propose a method of field stripping a computer system by empirically proving an equivalence between the trustability of the fielded system on one hand, and its comprehensive set of sources (including those of all toolchains used in its construction) on the other. In the long run, we hope to facilitate comprehensive verification and validation of fielded computer systems from fully self-contained hard-ware+software sources, as a way of mitigating against the lack of control over (and visibility into) the hardware supply chain.