A Lightweight Dual Authentication Protocol for the Internet of Vehicles

With the development of 5G communication technology, the status of the Internet of Vehicles in people's lives is greatly improved in the general trend of intelligent transportation. The combination of vehicles and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) makes the application prospects of vehicle networking gradually expand. However, the wireless network of the Internet of Vehicles is open and mobile, so it can be easily stolen or tampered with by attackers. Moreover, it will cause serious traffic security problems and even threat people's lives. In this paper, we propose a lightweight authentication protocol for the Internet of Vehicles based on a mobile RFID system and give corresponding security requirements for modeling potential attacks. The protocol is based on the three-party mutual authentication, and uses bit-operated left-cycle shift operations and hetero-oriented operations to generate encrypted data. The simultaneous inclusion of triparty shared key information and random numbers makes the protocol resistant to counterfeit attacks, violent attacks, replay attacks and desynchronization attacks. Finally, a simulation analysis of the security protocol using the ProVerif tool shows that the protocol secures is not accessible to attackers during the data transfer, and achieve the three-party authentication between sensor nodes (SN), vehicle nodes (Veh) and backend servers.