Where Am I Parking: Incentive Online Parking-Space Sharing Mechanism With Privacy Protection

Sharing private parking spaces during their idle time periods has shown great potential for addressing urban traffic congestion and illegitimate parking problems in smart cities. In this article, aiming to address the online parking-space sharing issue while ensuring the privacy of customer parking destination locations, we propose a novel destination privacy-preserving online parking sharing (DPOPS) incentive scheme. In particular, the online parking-space sharing problem is formalized as a social welfare maximization problem in a two-sided market, where parking-space providers (PSPs) and customers are regarded as sellers and buyers. Then, novel threshold value-based rules are designed to determine winners, payments, and reimbursement. Finally, winners are matched by solving a mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem, aiming to minimize the distance between customer’s destination and allocated parking space. In addition, the location privacy of the customers’ destinations is protected by the Laplace mechanism. We prove that DPOPS achieves several economically effective properties and approximate differential privacy. We analyze the upper bound of the efficiency loss of our scheme. Extensive evaluation results demonstrate that our scheme can not only achieve good performance regarding social welfare, PSP satisfaction ratio, privacy preservation, and computation overhead but also leads to shorter travel distances for customers comparing to the baseline scheme.
Note to Practitioners
—In this article, we address the online parking-space sharing issue with considering the parking-space providers (PSPs) and customers’ individual utility while preserving the location privacy of customers’ destinations. Most of the previous works focused on designing a centralized mechanism for allocating parking spaces without considering the protection of the customers’ location privacy. In particular, we propose an online parking-space sharing scheme called DPOPS, including a novel threshold value-based winner determination rule and a parking-space allocation rule. The proposed scheme DPOPS allows the PSPs and customers submit their bids and asks according to their own willingness and is able to improve the utilization of private parking spaces during their idle time periods. Moreover, the location privacy of customers’ destinations is protected by the Laplace mechanism. The experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach outperforms the exponential-based scheme in terms of PSP satisfaction ratio and the travel distance for parking-space customer. The proposed scheme is helpful in managing the vacant parking space in a competitive market and can be readily implemented in the real-world online parking-space sharing systems.