The Optimal Decisions for Formation International Joint Ventures under Uncertainty

This paper develops a model in which the two parties to an international joint venture (IJV) determine the optimal cost ratio and profit share and exercise the jointly held option to enter into an IJV in uncertain situations. In our setting, the two partners make their decisions sequentially under a two-stage Stackelberg game framework, where the risk-neutral multinational company as the leader first designs the cost and equity allocation, and then the risk-averse local firm follows by choosing the optimal timing at which to exercise the joint venture option. The Stackelberg equilibrium solutions to the model are obtained by using a mix of game theory and real options. The results of the numerical analysis show that despite the multinational company's dominant position in the IJV, its equity share is not always higher than that of the local company and is closely related to the expected growth rate, risk aversion level and market volatility. The cost ratio of the foreign partner will increase correspondingly with its equity ratio unless it faces much more uncertainty in the environment. In addition, an increase in risk aversion leads to the local company sharing a higher proportion of the equity and costs of the joint venture partnership. The findings of the study can provide scientific guidance and suggestions on the transnational joint venture for overseas investment, especially in the “One Belt and One Road” initiative.