Mutual-Preference Driven Truthful Auction Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsensing

Motivating the mobile users to participate in sensing services for efficient data generation and collection is one of the most critical issues in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems (MCSs). Auction based mechanisms are seen to be promising and effective solutions to incentivize mobile users. However, price is not the unique factor dominating participants' contribution in MCSs. Participant's preference for different sensing tasks is also a pivotal factor which should be considered in the auction mechanisms as assigning the least favorite tasks discourages them to participate in future sensing tasks. Unfortunately, participant's preference has been overlooked by most existing works, which motivates us to fill this gap in this paper. We first propose a new concept "mutual preference degree" to capture participant's preference and then design a preference-based auction mechanism (PreAM) to simultaneously guarantee individual rationality, budget feasibility, preference truthfulness, and price truthfulness. Finally, both the theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of PreAM.