Demonstration of Synchronization Attacks on Distributed and Cooperative Control in Microgrids

Microgrid platforms are experiencing an increasing integration of distributed and cooperative control coupled with communication links to guarantee safe and reliable operations of their distributed power generators (DG). However, they are subject to several threats and attacks because of the widely use of communication networks in their control layers. In this demo paper, we demonstrate the practical feasibility and the impact of a novel attack, named measurement as reference attack (MaR), on the distributed control mechanism of a microgrid, where an attacker replaces the reference values with measurements during its synchronization operations. We build in this work a hardware platform modelled after a simplified microgrid with DG units based on Raspberry Pi and Arduino boards, DC motors for power generation and light bulbs as electrical loads. We study two variations of the MaR attack using man-in-the-middle (MITM) and malware techniques to demonstrate and validate its impact on the microgrid synchronization and its voltage stability which affect end user's electrical devices.