A Lightweight and Provably Secure Key Agreement System for a Smart Grid With Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have attracted the attention of researchers from all disciplines. In such systems, physical devices collect data, interact with Internet, and send the gathered data to serve people. As one important part of such systems, a smart grid is accepted widely and has played a great role for information and communication technology (ICT) and power communities. Secure communication in the smart grid turns to be an urgent aim in the CPS. Several key agreement schemes have been devised in the literature for smart grids. Unfortunately, researchers are still searching for good ways to make the smart grid own anonymity and efficiency simultaneously. This study proposes a novel key agreement scheme for a smart grid with elliptic curve cryptography. Then, we use formal proof based on an authenticated key agreement to give the negligible probability of the attacker. The ProVerif code also proves that our scheme can withstand the simulated attackers under the Dolev-Yao model. By comparing of security properties and performance, our scheme is better than other recent competing schemes. Moreover, via simulation analysis using NS-3, it is found that our scheme is efficient and practical in communication.