A Triggered Delay-based Approach against Cache Privacy Attack in NDN

Content caching is one of the most significant features of Named Data Networking (NDN) which improves the performance of NDN. But this feature opens a gate for the attacker to access the cache and determine recent cache access pattern. An attacker can probe request and determine if the received content is cached or not by observing time difference between the request and data received. Previous solutions try to apply delay whenever the data is accessed from the cache. These approaches mitigate attack but compromise NDN performance. To overcome this issue, we have proposed a counter scheme in which the gateway router detects attack pattern and applies countermeasure. Our approach applies delay on data accessed from the cache, only when the attack is detected. We have compared our approach with the approach in which random delay is applied every time on cache hit. Our approach is better than random delay approach in terms of average delay.