On Incentive-Driven VNF Service Chaining in Inter-Datacenter Elastic Optical Networks: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Mechanism

In this paper, we propose an incentive-driven virtual network function service chaining (VNF-SC) framework for optimizing the cross-stratum resource provisioning in multi-broker orchestrated inter-datacenter elastic optical networks (IDC-EONs). The proposed framework employs a non-cooperative hierarchical game-theoretic mechanism, where the resource brokers and the VNF-SC users play the leader and the follower games, respectively. In the leader game, the brokers calculate VNF-SC service schemes for users and compete for the provisioning tasks. While in the follower game, the users compete for VNF-SC services for jointly optimizing the resource cost and the received quality-of-service. We first elaborate on the modeling of the follower game, discuss the existence of Nash equilibrium and propose a mixed-strategy gaming approach enabled by an auxiliary graph-based algorithm to facilitate users selecting the most appropriate service schemes. Then, under the assumption that the brokers are aware of the principle of the follower game, we present the model for the leader game and develop a time-efficient heuristic algorithm for brokers to compete for the provisioning tasks. Simulations show that the proposed incentive-driven VNF-SC framework significantly improves the network throughput (i.e., $>4.8 \times$ blocking reduction) while assisting users and brokers in achieving higher utilities compared with existing solutions.