Incentive Compatible Overlay D2D System: A Group-Based Framework without CQI Feedback

With the large expected demand of wireless communication, Device-to-Device (D2D) communication has been proposed as a promising technology to enhance network performance. Nevertheless, the selfish nature of potential D2D users may impale the performance of D2D-enabled network. In this paper, we propose a D2D-enabled cellular network framework, which support a novel group D2D mode under overlay D2D communication. The group-based design is derived from the discussions of two common D2D modes, divided and shared D2D modes, regarded as special cases. The proposed framework provides a pricing-based dynamic Stackelberg game for optimal mode selection and spectrum partitioning. We propose the incentive compatible pricing strategy to provide proper incentive for these selfish potential D2D pairs to make optimal choices in mode selection. Our results show that the pricing and spectrum partition strategy effectively prevents selfish potential D2D users from harming the system performance while fully exploits the potential of D2D communication.