Case study analysis on BGP: Prefix hijacking and transit AS

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) takes the critical role in conveying routing information between thousand AS numbers in the internet network today. Therefore, this routing protocol is highly vulnerable to security issues that can devastate the internet itself. In this paper, there are two BGP case studies on internet to be analyzed. . These case studies illustrate how the problem happens using small-scale lab topology and then c. The first case is prefix hijacking done by an ISP toward Google's network prefixes. To prevent this problem, a practical solution is proposed that is implementing prefix filtering both on ingress and egress filtering. These filtering can ensure the prefix that should be received from and should be advertised to BGP peers. However, this solution still needs further improvement to overcome the scalability issue. The second case is BGP problem in transit AS. This issue is caused by multihoming client. The client readvertised the received internet traffic from primary upstream to its secondary upstream so that its secondary upstream's BGP peering becomes disconnected because of receiving too many internet prefixes. The multihoming client uses its AS as transit AS. This problem can be overcome by using BGP community NO_EXPORT feature.