Behavior simulation of “Chinese style road crossing” based on evolutionary game theory

This paper aims at studying the changes in the number of pedestrians who go across road in “Chinese ways” to discover the evolution laws and behavior influential factors. The model including pedestrians crossing behavior analysis without supervising are established, and the profit matrix is acquired by intercepting the scene of “Chinese style road crossing”. The influence of variety of decision-making parameters on evolution is discussed. The effect of variety of revenue and loss of ordinary pedestrian and adventure illegal pedestrian, and the effect of changing initial condition on the evolution results are shown by numerical simulation. It is found that “Chinese style road crossing” may not only evolve to good state, but also evolve to bad state, and forms “lock in” convergence state of behavior is dependent on relative payment of various tactics between ordinary pedestrian and adventure illegal pedestrian. Evolutionary routes for “Chinese style road crossing” can be optimized and guide the adventure illegal behavior making for the good direction.