Impacts of Demand Response on oligopolistic behavior of electricity market players in the day-ahead energy market

This paper investigates the effects of Demand Response Programs (DRPs) on the behavior of electricity market players in the day-ahead energy market. To this end, an electricity market environment is proposed based on the multi-agent systems in order to model the strategic self-scheduling of each market player as an individual agent. In such oligopolistic environment, market interactions are considered by using a game theoretic model and the market transactions are cleared by means of a security constrained unit commitment problem. Different types of DRPs are also considered consisting of Time Of Use (TOU), Real Time Pricing (RTP), Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), and Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP). The proposed model is applied on a modified IEEE six-bus test system. The numerical results indicate that different types of DRPs differently affect the oligopolistic behavior of market players that should be studied by the system operators before their implementation.