A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks

Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in existing deployments is a collection of inter-connected avionics equipment supported by wired technology, with stringent reliability and safety requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically secured so that a malicious user cannot access them directly, then this simplifies the security management of the network. However, substituting the wired network with a wireless network - also referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) - brings a set of new challenges related to assurance, reliability, and security; even for a specific set of well-defined and non-critical tasks. The AWN has to ensure that it provides at a minimum the existing required levels of safety offered by the equivalent wired network. These challenges are underpinned by a necessity to boot the AWN to a secure and trusted state, before it can be used to bridge different parts of the IMA in an aircraft. In this paper, we discuss the security and trust challenges an AWN boot process might face, along with highlighting a potential solution. Finally, the paper evaluates the proposed validation solution that meets the stated security requirements, based on the security challenges discussed.