Greening the Airwaves With Collaborating Mobile Network Operators

Base station sharing is currently considered one of the most promising solutions for reducing the energy consumption costs of cellular networks. This paper presents a game theoretic framework for the study of such cooperative solutions where different mobile network operators (MNOs) decide to switch off subsets of their base stations during off-peak hours and roam their traffic to the remaining stations. The solution is based on a detailed optimization framework that determines exactly which base stations should remain active and how much traffic each one of them should serve, so as to maximize the aggregate energy savings. Accordingly, using the axiomatic Shapley value rule, it is determined how the benefits from the cooperation, i.e., the cost savings, should be dispersed among the cooperating MNOs. It is proved that this coalitional game with transferrable utilities has a nonempty core, and thus there exists a cooperation solution that incentivizes the participation of all operators. Moreover, using a thorough numerical analysis, it is shown that the benefits achieved with the implementation of the cooperation strategy depend mainly on the power consumption characteristics of the MNOs, which in turn are related to the number, type, and technology of their base stations. Overall, the energy savings are found to be most sensitive to the technology of the used base stations, and more precisely to the no-load base station energy consumption which defines the energy waste in a network.