The rules of engagement for cyber-warfare and the Tallinn Manual: A case study

Documents such as the Geneva (1949) and Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) that have clearly outlined the rules of engagement for warfare find themselves challenged by the presence of a new arena: cyber. Considering the potential nature of these offenses, operations taking place in the realm of cyber cannot simply be generalized as “cyber-warfare,” as they may also be acts of cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism, cyber-sabaotge, etc. Cyber-attacks, such as those on Estonia in 2007, have begun to test the limits of NATO's Article 5 and the UN Charter's Article 2(4) against the use of force. What defines “force” as it relates to cyber, and what kind of response is merited in the case of uncertainty regarding attribution? In 2009, NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence commissioned a group of experts to publish a study on the application of international law to cyber-warfare. This document, the Tallinn Manual, was published in 2013 as a non-binding exercise to stimulate discussion on the codification of international law on the subject. After analysis, this paper concludes that the Tallinn Manual classifies the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program as an illegal act of force. The purpose of this paper is the following: (1) to analyze the historical and technical background of cyber-warfare, (2) to evaluate the Tallinn Manual as it relates to the justification cyber-warfare, and (3) to examine the applicability of the Tallinn Manual in a case study of a historical example of a cyber-attacks.