Spectrum Coordination in Energy-Efficient Cognitive Radio Networks

Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a challenging problem, particularly since users experience varying spectrum availability over time and in different locations. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach that allows cognitive radio (CR) pairs, namely the primary user (PU) and the secondary user (SU), to update their transmission power and frequencies simultaneously. Specifically, we address a Stackelberg game model in which individual users attempt to hierarchically access to the wireless spectrum while maximizing their energy efficiency. A thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness, and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is conducted. In particular, we show that a spectrum coordination naturally occurs when both actors in the system decide sequentially about their power and their transmitting carriers. As a result, spectrum sensing in such a situation turns out to be a simple detection of the presence/absence of a transmission on each subband. We also show that when users experience very different channel gains on their two carriers, they may choose to transmit on the same carrier at the SE as this contributes enough energy efficiency to outweigh the interference degradation caused by the mutual transmission. Then, we provide an algorithmic analysis on how the PU and the SU can reach such a spectrum coordination using an appropriate learning process. We validate our results through extensive simulations and compare the proposed algorithm to some typical scenarios, including the non-cooperative case in the work of Meshkati et al. and the throughput-based-utility systems. Typically, it is shown that the proposed Stackelberg decision approach optimizes the energy efficiency while still maximizing the throughput at the equilibrium.