Risk informed optimization of nuclear instrumentation for emergency conditions

Emergency conditions after a nuclear accident are different in each case and cannot be predicted accurately. The accident at TMI did not contaminate the environment. The accident at Chernobyl had a large, early release of nuclear contamination, widely dispersed over many countries. Although there was no large, early release of contamination at Fukushima Daiichi, the timeline of the accident included days of later contamination of various degrees of severity. A large amount of the contamination has been released to the ocean and an exclusion zone still exists around the station. In all of these accidents there were no adequate radiation monitoring systems distant from the origin point that could provide accurate status to the authorities and the local population. In the recent years a number of new nuclear monitoring systems have been implemented or are under development to be installed in areas that might be exposed to nuclear contamination in emergencies. Based on the risk informed optimization methodology, this paper provides recommendations for selecting the quantity and type of instrumentation, the location and sampling of data, and the real-time processing of information.