SATS: Secure Average-Consensus-Based Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks

It is important and challenging to achieve secure time synchronization in wireless sensor networks, which may be deployed in a hostile environment under various malicious attacks. The recently developed average-consensus-based time synchronization protocol (ATS) is a promising alternative as it does not depend on any reference node or network topology, which makes it robust to different kinds of attacks, e.g., denial-of-service, node destruction, etc. However, the in-network information fusion nature of average consensus makes the ATS vulnerable to the well-known message manipulation attacks. In this paper, we focus on how to defend the ATS protocol in wireless sensor networks under message manipulation attacks. We first investigate the impact of message manipulation attacks over ATS, and derive a necessary condition for ATS to converge. Then based on the obtained insights, we propose a novel adjusting parameter checking mechanism which exploits the two-hop neighboring information to dynamically constrain the attackers. We further incorporate all checking processes into the traditional ATS protocol to form a secure average-consensus-based time synchronization protocol (SATS). We prove that SATS guarantees the network time synchronization with an exponentially converging speed.