Byzantine Robustness for future inter-domain routing security through integrated management plane

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de-facto interdomain routing protocol exploited in the Internet today. Future Internet will not serve as a trustworthy vehicle for communication without overcoming BGP security challenges. While security should be a built-in element of any good design, it seems to be an arduous add-on process for BGP. The protocol suffers from the Byzantine Failure whence a legitimate node simply misbehaves. Currently, no systematic method determines whether the received information from an Autonomous System (AS) is valid or not in a global scale. This is due to the absence of an integrated managerial plane operating upon the control plane in our minds. We propose a hybrid method by an overlay network with a global, shared view of the address space ownership performing over the highly-connected ASes merely for the veracity check of the BGP origins. Subsequently, by breaking the hop-by-hop paradigm of BGP with the aid of our introduced management plane, we reach a level of Byzantine Robustness in which the risk pertaining to BGP prefix hijacking as a severe instance of Byzantine attacks is mitigated to a large extent.