Cooperation-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing via Multi-Winner Auction of Multiple Bands

In this paper, we study a cooperation-based dynamic spectrum leasing mechanism via multi-winner auction of multiple bands. Based on a second-price auction mechanism, the primary users independently conduct auctions to determine winners who are then granted access to leased bands and prices for those bands. Before auctions, each secondary user jointly chooses bands which they want to lease and generates bids for those bands with a limited transmit power budget. To this end, we determine the feasibility conditions for band selection and for power and time allocation. Further, we propose a low complexity bidding algorithm that iteratively selects a band and calculates the bid for that band. For the paying price among winners after auctions, a multi-objective optimization problem is considered. We derive Pareto optimal solutions and propose paying schemes that prioritize the objectives with pre-defined weighting rules. In addition, the payment and secondary utility are investigated with regard to the number of winners. Simulation results show that secondary users achieve significantly increased utility as more winners are chosen, while primary users are guaranteed a non-negative benefit from spectrum leasing. The power consumed by the secondary users for cooperative transmission is compared for the proposed paying schemes.