An experimental analysis of Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction formats and Combinatorial Clock Auction formats

Auctions have been used in the process of spectrum allocation for the last two decades. A commonly used format for assigning spectrum licenses is the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA). In order to reduce the possibility of unwanted outcomes (i.e. assigning licences for non-contiguous spectrum blocks) and increase auction (i.e. allocative) efficiency, first the SMRA with Switching (SMRA+S) and later the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) formats were introduced. In this paper we present the CCA with a Dutch phase (CCA+D) format, our proposed modification of the CCA format. We conducted a set of experiments where a group of participants bid for spectrum licenses using four different auction formats (i.e. SMRA, SMRA+S, CCA and CCA+D). The regulator's revenue, auction (i.e. allocative) efficiency and operators' successfulness in the conducted auctions are outlined.