Algebraic Watchdog: Mitigating Misbehavior in Wireless Network Coding

We propose a secure scheme for wireless network coding, called the algebraic watchdog. By enabling nodes to detect malicious behaviors probabilistically and use overheard messages to police their downstream neighbors locally, the algebraic watchdog delivers a secure global self-checking network. Unlike traditional Byzantine detection protocols which are receiver-based, this protocol gives the senders an active role in checking the node downstream. The key idea is inspired by Marti et al.'s watchdog-pathrater, which attempts to detect and mitigate the effects of routing misbehavior. We first focus on a two-hop network. We present a graphical model to understand the inference process nodes execute to police their downstream neighbors; as well as to compute, analyze, and approximate the probabilities of misdetection and false detection. We also present an algebraic analysis of the performance using an hypothesis testing framework that provides exact formulae for probabilities of false detection and misdetection. We then extend the algebraic watchdog to a more general network setting, and propose a protocol in which we can establish trust in coded systems in a distributed manner. We develop a graphical model to detect the presence of an adversarial node downstream within a general multi-hop network. The structure of the graphical model (a trellis) lends itself to well-known algorithms (e.g. the Viterbi algorithm) which can compute the probabilities of misdetection and false detection. We show that as long as the min-cut is not dominated by the adversaries, upstream nodes can monitor downstream neighbors and allow reliable communication with certain probability. Finally, we present simulation results that support our analysis.