Efficient MAC in cognitive radio systems: A game-theoretic approach

In this paper, we study the problem of efficient medium access control (MAC) among cognitive radio devices that are equipped with multiple radios and thus are capable of transmitting simultaneously at different frequencies (channels). We assume that radios contend on each channel using the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. We study two MAC problems: (i) the allocation of the available channels among radios, and (ii) the optimal usage of each allocated channel by the radios occupying it. Both problems are studied in a game-theoretic setting, where devices aim to selfishly maximize their share of the available bandwidth. As for the first problem, we show that the “price of anarchy” is close to 1, that is, Nash equilibria imply nearly system optimal allocations of the available channels. For the second problem, we design a game such that it admits a unique Nash equilibrium that is is both fair and Pareto-optimal. Furthermore, we propose simple mechanisms that enable selfish cognitive radio devices not only to coordinate efficiently on the available channels but also to optimally use every single allocated channel.